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After and Before Nine-Eleven: A Civilizational Clash
ISCSC 2008 Conference Keynote Address
Toby E. Huff
Harvard University
thuff@fas.Harvard.edu
On the morning of September 11, 2001, I was in Kuala
Lumpur, the capital city of Malaysia, and it was nearly nine
o'clock in the evening—as Asia is about 12 hours ahead of
East Coast time in the U.S. Luckily, I was more interested in
getting some sleep than in watching the latest news.
So when I awoke the next morning and retrieved my
email, the first message I got was from a young Malaysian
colleague who wrote, "Prof— US is bombed!" Of course the
news struck me with disbelief as it did my Chinese-Malaysian
colleague and all other Malaysians. As we know, from that
point onward, attitudes towards America from outside the
US began their subtle shift from awe and appreciation to
suddenly expressed dislike and opprobrium.
The overbearing US role in world affairs up to that
point in history suddenly came to be seen, as one Malaysian
intellectual put it just a couple of weeks after 9/11, as the
worst influence on the world in the whole 20 century.
A more ambivalent attitude was expressed by one of my
cab drivers who said of the 9/11 events, "it was bad because
innocent people were killed, but it was good because the US
got a slap in the face." We have all heard these sentiments
before. Since the US invasion of Iraq attitudes towards the
US have mainly gone down hill, as various international
surveys show.
But what of the fact that the airplane hijackers were
Muslim militants and were, so they thought, in the service of
th
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an Islamic jihad against the West sponsored by the shadowy
organization called al-Qaeda?
As a scholar who had sympathy for Muslims as religious
people and who knew many Muslims personally, my first
reaction to the 9/11 events was to think that this was the
most disastrous event to befall the Muslim world in its entire
history—even including the Mongol sacking of Baghdad in
1258.
However, the events of 9/11 represent an encounter of
a totally different order: Muslim militants had violently
attacked two US cities—New York and Washington, D.C. and from an interreligious point of view, the 9/11 events were
the most devastating calamity for the Islamic world because
it was a highly visible event, instantly relayed around the
world. Consequently, once it was known with certainty that
the highjackers were Muslims, it meant that Muslims around
the world would be branded by people in the West, rightly or
wrongly, as terrorists.
The undeniable assault on the most significant symbol
of Western hegemony, the United States, above all, the
World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon
in Washington, D.C., by undoubted Islamic militants from
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, sealed the fate of Islam as a militant
religion, if not a terrorist faith.
Of course there were Americans and others who
sympathetically asked, "Why do they hate us?" and who
believed that the terrorist attack was in some way provoked
by the overbearing posture of the US in the World. But it
should be noted that the "they" here is really a small band of
terrorists associated with al-Qaeda, not the broader Muslim
public.
So I ask—what should we make of the putative clash of
religious fanatics from the Middle East with the West?
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol60/iss60/5
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After the unfolding of the events of 9/11 and even after
the blundering war in Iraq, I have come to three conclusions:
The first is that the 9/11 attacks were the product of a
civilizational clash that began in the 20 century. Second,
this dramatic clash of the 21 century has in fact burst a
bubble that previously prevented any serious civilizational
dialogue between Islam and the Christian world. That is to
say, for generations despite many ecumenical overtures from
sympathetic Western intellectuals, Muslim religious leaders
consistently refused to enter into a dialogue with Western
religious leaders.
A very recent expression of that attitude occurred in
tranquil Malaysia in 2002. It took the form of prohibiting any
public discussion of Islam by those "with little knowledge of
Islam." That edict by the religious authorities of Malaysia
ensnared very unlikely scholars, one being a Muslim Ph.D.
in Political Science who was also an outspoken journalist.
Another was the first Malaysian born non-Muslim who was
fully trained in Islamic studies and knew Arabic. She was
a woman teaching at the University of Malaya. Both were
warned not to speak about Islam publicly. As far as I know
the ban remains in effect. Nevertheless, I do think the door
is open for at least tentative dialogue.
But my third conclusion is that there is a fundamental
underlying clash of civilizations (in a non-violent sense). It
stems from the irreducible fact that Islamic law (shari'a) and
international, Western inspired law are essentially different.
Our Western and largely Christian-inspired assumption
is that religion is about correct theological belief (that is,
orthodoxy) but in the Islamic world the issue is one of
orthopraxy, that is, proper conduct.
For Muslims, the question is how to be a good Muslim if
you do not follow the Shari'a (Islamic sacred law). In the most
lh
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practical sense, Islamic law is about whether some action
is permitted, encouraged, commanded, or forbidden. While
there is a general concern for social justice in the Muslim
world, the grand issues of constitutionalism, creating proper
spheres of legaljurisdiction, citizenship and universal human
rights have not played significant parts in Islamic religious
and legal thought until very recently.
And while it is true that law in the Muslim world was
reformed and remade along the lines of Western law from the
late 19 century to the present, that reform and replacement
has come to be seen by large segments of the Muslim world
as unwanted.
Accordingly, that history which pushed the traditional
Islamic concerns about proper social conduct aside in favor
of international law that stresses abstract, impersonal, and
theoretical standards for groups of people has become a
source of rejection for certain segments of the Muslim world.
In other words, removing the Shari'a (Islamic sacred law)
from the center of the Muslim community could be seen as
removing the heart of Islam.
Let me try to spell out the path to this deeper crisis that
has been very poorly managed by politicians and religious
leaders in the West and in the Muslim world during the past
century and in the present.
3
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4

A Civilizational Paradigm
First a couple words about our "civilizational" paradigm.
It is clear that this great worldwide encounter of the early
21 century is a "Civilizational" conflict, not a nationalist
clash between the United States (or the US & Europe) and a
nation-state such as Viet Nam—or Iraq.
Invoking those two names will tell us that unlike the war
in Viet Nam, involving an aspiring nationalist movement
st
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and a military intervention by the US, today's conflict is
entirely different from the past, despite that political leaders
in Washington stumbled into a so-called "War on Terror"
that is based on the wrong paradigm.
The prevailing view in Washington (certainly under
the Bush Administration) and, I'm sure, in policy circles,
is one in which nation states are the primary actors while
the possibility of civilizational identities and civilizational
issues are completely overlooked.
Whether we speak of the war in Iraq or the broader
symbolic conflict involving actors in the Muslim world, we
are talking about an encounter between two large civilizational
areas—the so-called West and the Muslim world - each held
together symbolically and practically by their contrasting
religious, legal, and philosophical orientations.
Indeed these two great units were founded on very
different legal conceptions, philosophical assumptions,
and theological orientations. I say this even though there
are those who point out that the "three religions of the
book" (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) share the same
"Abrahamic" religious foundations. That may be so, but it
does not negate the existence of the intellectual, legal, and
philosophical differences (about which I shall say more) that
need to be seen through the prism of civilizational analysis.
Furthermore, these differences of worldview have been
around for centuries; they are not new, although Americans
(and many Europeans) are discovering them for the first
time. Furthermore the conflict with the Islamic world also
exists with other parts of the world besides the West.
In short, the present worldwide conflict is a contemporary
historical laboratory designed just for us Civilizationalists
who want to study how civilizations are constructed, how
6
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they operate, and how they do or do not enter into peaceful
dialogue with each other.
20 Century Shifts of Authority in the Muslim world
The conflict and encounter that I am highlighting here
must be seen against major events and shifts in world history
in the 20 century. Indeed it must be seen as part of interactive
world history. Historians, for example, have long noted the
conflicts and encounters between the West and the Muslim
world, especially during the late Ottoman period, such as the
siege of Vienna in 1687 (not to mention the crusades).
Likewise in the late 18 century we witness European
armies beginning to invade the Middle East, launching what
many call the rise of European colonialism and imperialism.
But what has not been fully appreciated is the degree to which
the 20 century was a singularly transformative period for
the Islamic world, shaped by the forces of Westernization.
That process was seen by significant numbers of Muslims
as Western cultural imperialism. This was a period of intense
encounters between the Muslim countries of the Middle East
and Western influences—some military and some simply
cultural and economic. But the fact that articulate Muslim
spokesmen saw it as cultural imperialism suggests how
different the civilizational foundations of "East" and "West"
were perceived to be in the Muslim world.
The complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a result
of World War I was a huge event that had a tremendous impact
on Muslims across the Middle East and the world. The result
was the carving up of an empire into nation-states across
a vast region that Muslims saw as a religious caliphate, a
political empire based allegedly on following the rulership
of Mohammad.
th
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However, it was only late in the 17 century that the
Ottoman Sultans (re)claimed the title of "successor" to
the Prophet (Caliph of Islam). Nevertheless, this collapse
of an empire destroyed any illusion that the Muslim world
represented a coherent political or military power. This was a
powerful shock to the psyche of Muslims across the Middle
East and it generated a sense of humiliation that continues to
reverberate in the 21 century.
For some Muslims, especially those outside Turkey, the
idea of creating a whole new state apparatus in Muslim lands
based on Western models was the ultimate betrayal of the
Muslims' conception of religious leadership.
The program of Mustapha Kemal Atatiirk to create a new
nation-state out of Turkey was designed to jettison Islamic
educational institutions and Islamic law in favor of Western
models. For Atatiirk there was no doubt but that Islamic law,
culture and educational practices were responsible for the
economic, scientific and technological retardation of Islamic
civilization, and that Western and international models had to
be incorporated in his new state to secure a firm foundation
for development. Even Arabic script was to be abandoned.
Equally radical was the Kemalist mandate that women
were to have an equal share in national affairs while being
forbidden to wear Islamic head coverings in public. All of this
appeared in the new Constitutional legislation of 1923 and
thereafter, along with the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate
(1924).
Likewise in Egypt, reformers appeared at the end of the
19 century who understood the need to reform Muslim
education and to fill gaps in Islamic law by incorporating
Western legal reforms. Yet the madrasas could not be
reformed because they were essentially static legal forms,
and their scholarly representatives had no interest in reform.
th
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Madrasas were designed to preserve the "transmitted"
Islamic sciences, not to promote intellectual innovation.
Of course there are many reasons for thinking that the
attempt to reform Middle Eastern forms of law, government,
and education was a good and essential thing. Indeed, neither
traditional Islamic education nor Islamic law embodied in
the Shari'a was capable of preparing people or societies for
full participation in the modern world, especially the modern
world that we now inhabit.
It should also be noted that up until the late 19 century,
there was nothing like an Arab national consciousness,
largely because of the dominance of the Ottoman Turks in
the region for centuries. Consequently, the so-called Arab
awakening occurred in the late 1880s, and flowered only
briefly with the collapse of the Ottomans."
In the end, the Arabs were unable to create a national
or regional organization that had any political significance
until after the time of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. In the
1950s, he cobbled together a "United Arab Republic" that
was as ephemeral as the maps he had printed to pretend that
the entity existed.
But that said, it is not difficult to imagine that with the
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the imposition of
Western ideas along with other intrusions, there would be
loud voices raised throughout the Muslim world opposing
such a radical remaking of Muslim civilization along the
lines of Western civilization.
Oppositional, and some would say, reactionary voices
emerged across the Muslim world that opposed the reforms
that the generation of reformers of the early twentieth
century had proposed to carry out—precisely for the purpose
of uplifting and modernizing Muslims educationally,
economically and politically.
10
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For sure, a variety of new social, political and economic
forms based on Western ideas were incorporated in Middle
Eastern countries during the first half of the 20 century, but
the indigenous reaction against them by what I shall call the
new Islamism, or Political Islam, ultimately won the day,
tragically impacting the world on 9/11 in this century.
The great irony of the history of the Middle East in the
20 century is that in many places it ended up far more
conservative and Islamist than it was at the opening of that
century. This is to say, an Islamic identity transcending
national identities became more intense and real than in
previous generations, and it increasingly became defined in
opposition to the so-called "West."
From a developmental point of view, it might be said
that for the Muslim world, it was a lost century because very
little political and economic progress has been made, and
certainly far less than in Asia. For very different reasons that
lost developmental progress could be compared to China
that also lost a whole century (or more), yet now has taken
immense strides forward.
But let us return to the problem of the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire, the displacement of the traditional ulama,
coupled with the encroachment of Western powers who
hoped to remake the Middle East along the lines of a very
different civilizational design.
th
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Up until the middle of the 20 century, old-style Islamic
scholars, the ulama, held sway within Muslim circles, and
maintained pre-modern views on most subjects, including
antipathy to the modern media, to aspects of modern science
and technology, and many other innovations. They were
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indeed illiterate in the ways of modern society as it then
existed.
However, the 20 century saw the rise of what I shall
call lay-scholars who more or less usurped the traditional
role of the ulama. Once the exclusive right of the religious
scholars to speak out on religious topics had been breached,
a variety of educated Muslims dared to add their voices, and
sometimes dominated discussion.
Sometimes, as we have seen recently, in the rhetoric
of the ideologues of al-Qaeda, their brand of Islam is not
progressive. There are many reasons for this redirection of
Islamic thought that coalesced in mid-20 century. Most
significantly, the new Islamists were not trained in traditional
Islamic institutions, that is, not trained in the law schools
of the madrasas, with the result that they pushed aside a
major principle of Islamic legal thought, that is, the concept
of consensus (ijma). This is the putative consensus of the
scholars, especially the ancient scholars on legal questions.
The three most significant examples of this process of
displacing the traditional scholars include Hassan al-Banna,
the Egyptian school teacher who founded the Muslim
Brotherhood in 1928; Sayyid Qutb who became the chief
intellectual architect of the Muslim Brotherhood from the
late 1950s until his execution by Gamal Abdel Nasser in
1966; and Maulana Mawdudi, the journalist turned religious
commentator, who worked out the rationale for turning
Pakistan into an ideological Islamic state back in the 1950s.
He also significantly influenced Qutb. Of course the 13
century conservative religious scholar, Ibn Tamiyya, also
added fuel for this new identity.
All three of these 20 century Islamists—al-Banna,
Qutb, and Mawdudi—saw Islam as the answer to the
Muslim community's problems, its stagnation and political
th
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impotence. They pushed it in an Islamist direction that called
for a return to some imagined pure and harmonious state in
the Islamic past. Together they shaped the new activist Islam
that proved to be so widely supported throughout the Middle
East, and to a lesser degree, in many parts of Asian Islam. I
shall discuss only the first two of these intellectual architects
of the new Muslim identity.
The Muslim Brothers
It might seem that the collapse of a large empire such
as the Ottomans, which has often been labeled militaristic,
autocratic, and oppressive for Muslims outside of Anatolia,
would be greeted either with happiness or scarcely noticed at
all by ordinary Muslims.
That collapse, however, was accompanied by Ataturk's
reforms that I noted earlier, but also the occupation of Egypt
by British forces along with French occupation of major
parts of the Maghreb. These acts of colonialism spawned
a profound sense of alienation and oppression on the part
of Muslims in Egypt and North Africa. Soon the Egyptians
rallied to end the British political occupation while others
rallied to reject every aspect of the worldview that the British
occupiers represented.
The founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in that context
reflected a deep emotional resonance. It suggested that
Muslims in Egypt had fallen into the hands of a completely
alien power that was, in their view, not just occupying their
land, but bent on destroying the soul of Islam and their
identity.
Perhaps more surprising is that a humble school teacher,
Hassan al-Banna, born in a remote Egyptian village, grappled
with the core meaning of this civilizational encounter and,
through relentless preaching and political activism, created
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2009
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the Muslim Brotherhood that became the most significant
political force in modern Egyptian history.
He is the major figure who first constructed the idea that
"Islam is the solution." According to his way of thinking,
Muslims had to confront the challenge of the West. From
his point of view, the decadence, state of humiliation, and
depravity he saw in Egypt in the 1920s was caused by
Muslims falling away from their true faith. Furthermore, he
held that it is "the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be
dominated, to impose its law on all nations, and to extend its
power to the entire planet."
The struggle to regain that true faith became the
springboard for all sorts of activist Islamist groups that
agitated for the singularity of the Muslim way of life, to the
exclusion of modern and Western ideas. And it spawned a
variety ofjihadi groups.
As the movement grew it adopted a variety of organizing
techniques, established publishing houses, and founded
hospitals, schools, factories and welfare societies to benefit
Muslims. The Brotherhood even raised a small army for the
purpose of fighting in Palestine.
In 1949 when Hassan al-Banna was assassinated by
government agents —probably in reaction to the violence
and murder that the Muslim Brothers had sponsored—his
intellectual successor, Sayyid Qutb was in the United States
(in New York). He had not yet joined the Islamist movement.
Moreover, he had been known up until that point as a
novelist, poet and literary critic, not a religious writer. He
had also served as Minister of Education. But when he got
back to Cairo, the decadence and corruption, the availability
of Western movie houses, restaurants serving alcohol, along
with the extreme womanizing of King Farouk, sent Qutb into
16
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an extreme reaction against all forms of modern Western
life, more extreme even than al-Banna's reaction.
Although Qutb spent most of his time in the U.S. in rural
Greeley, Colorado, he came away from America repulsed by
the freedom of young men and women to mix freely and
to dance in public. No doubt the sexual freedoms, even as
old-fashioned as they now seem to us, offended Qutb. By
temperament he was an abstemious person and the signs
of hedonism he saw in the U.S, and probably even more so
in Egypt under western influences, turned him resolutely
against the West and modernity.
From that point onward he devoted his life to articulating
his version of the proper Muslim way of life, setting it sharply
against Western culture and sensibilities. He became the new
architect of the ideology of the Muslim Brothers. There was
no doubt in his mind, that of the two dangers, losing territory
or losing his idea of the Muslim way of life, it was the latter
that was the most dangerous.
One might lose territory and still preserve the Muslim
way of life; but if a community retained all its territory
but did not preserve its Islamic way of life, then all was
lost. Consequently, he saw the founding of the Israeli state
in Palestine in 1948 as a lesser evil than the corruption
and unlslamic behavior of Egyptian officials and private
citizens.
Nevertheless, the officers involved in the coup d'etat
that brought Gamal Abdel Nasser to power in 1952 had been
involved with the Muslim Brothers. Nasser at first encouraged
them, but the inability of Qutb and the Muslim Brothers to
accommodate to the Socialist regime of Nasser put them on
a collision course with the Egyptian state apparatus that has
lasted from the time of Qutb to the present. In October 1954,
several Muslim Brothers attempted to assassinate Nasser,
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2009
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and that led to the crackdown on the Brotherhood and Qutb's
imprisonment along with others.
During the 10 years of his imprisonment, Qutb managed
to continue organizing the Muslim Brothers while writing
tracts in support of their cause. He wrote a very extensive
commentary on the Quran {In the Shade of the Quran),
though he was not a person trained in religious or legal
scholarship. In addition to that, he wrote a little book called
Milestones (or Signposts) on the Way, published in 1964
when he was released from prison.
In this work Qutb created a manifesto redefining the
Muslim way as one absolutely dedicated to the observance of
the Shari 'a, Islamic sacred law, as if there were no question
about what it prescribed or what it meant. He insisted even
more than al-Banna that Islam was a complete way of life
and that it was at its core unalterably opposed to Western
ideas and ideals.
The most radical element of Qutb's manifesto was his
redefinition of the concept of Jahiliyya, the pre-Islamic "era
of ignorance" before the arrival of the Prophet Mohammad.
He re-interpreted this to mean any past or contemporary
state in which the Shari'a was not fully imposed on the
Muslim community. That meant that virtually every Muslim
community then existing was in a state of Jahiliyya, a state
of ignorance and/or disobedience to God's law.
Furthermore, Qutb claimed that it was the duty of every
true Muslim to oppose such a state and to engage in jihad,
religious and political struggle, to depose the leaders of such
communities or states and to work toward the imposition of
the sacred law of Islam, the Shari 'a. Qutb clearly championed
the idea of jihad as a battle against unbelievers, but those
unbelievers included not only non-Muslims in the West or
elsewhere, but also nominal Muslims who did not follow the
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol60/iss60/5
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narrow prescriptions of Islamic law as understood by Qutb
and the Muslim Brothers.
This led in the 1960s to the formation of several other
groups of jihadis. These included a group called Takfir w 'al
hijra ("Condemn and Emigrate") as well as a group committed
to the tactical use of violence, the Gamaa Islamiyya.'
For the Western world it is perhaps the founding of alJihad that seems most significant. It was founded by two
Islamist ideologues who joined al-Qaeda: one was Ayman
al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian-trained doctor who became Bin
Laden's lieutenant; the other was another physician, now
known as Dr Fadl, who was the real leader of that group and
a major intellectual sponsor of violent jihad in the 1980s. Dr
Fadl has recently made international headlines by publicly
renouncing his earlier justifications of the use of violence.
It should be observed that this radical idea of condemning
other Muslims because they do not conform to a particularly
rigid Islamist idea of proper Muslim conduct gave these
essentially lay individuals an extraordinary power never
before taken so seriously in the Muslim world.
As I noted earlier, this intellectual turn completely
jettisoned the third root of Islamic law— that is— scholarly
consensus. Of course this is a vague idea but it does imply that
one needs to consult the major legal scholars of the past and
present before issuing an edict. Furthermore these takfiris,
as these lay ideologues have been called, were generally not
juridically qualified to make such statements, that is, to issue
fatwas.
Nevertheless, this new idea of condemning all those who
disagree with one's own religious commitments that emerged
in the 1960s gave extraordinary power to self-appointed
Islamists while at the same time it undermined the role of the
traditional religious scholars, the ulama. Armed with these
7
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new doctrines, the Muslim Brothers became more dangerous
than they had been before as they displaced the traditional
scholars (the ulama). Consequently, Nasser moved once
again to put them in jail, including Qutb, who was executed
in 1966 for advocating violence.
Another indication of how far this ideology of "condemn
and emigrate" spread in the years after the founding of the
Takfir w'l hijra is seen in recent reports that some of the
insurgents held in Iraqi prisons have been referred to as
"takfiris." That is, those who hold very narrow views of
Islamic conduct and feel free to use torture or other violent
means to intimidate their fellow Muslims.
Hard on the heels of these dramatic events in Cairo
surrounding Qutb's execution in 1966, another major event
that many readers will recall took place: the Six-day June war
of 1967. It is said that the small Israeli forces defeated the
"whole Arab world" in just six days. This defeat of the Arab
forces had an enormous psychological impact on Muslims
throughout the region. Students of this era maintain that this
event tipped the balance, triggering a great wave of religious
revival that swept across the region.
It is from this time onward that one finds the sudden
flowering of Islamic dress in places like Cairo, Damascus
and elsewhere: men growing beards and women returning to
the veil and much more. The general interpretation of this
turning point is, almost following Qutb's diagnosis, that God
punished the Muslims for falling away from Islam, whereas
the Jews, according to the Muslim view, proved stronger
because of their greater religious faith and won the war. Of
course this was projection as far as most Jews and Israelis
are concerned.
This upsurge of religious sentiments was accompanied
by a rise in government-sponsored religious programming
20
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on radio and TV and the flowering of the "Islamist trend,"
the religious awakening that has swept through all the
professional associations, doctors, lawyers, judges, engineers
and students in Egyptian universities during the last 30 years
of the 20 century. It can be found in many other states in
the Middle East and North Africa.
In the meantime, Sayyid's Qutb's tract called Milestones
on the Way became a best seller and is probably the most
influential book in the Muslim world after the Quran itself,
even though it was banned in Egypt and other countries.
It is reported to have gone through 2,000 editions, not just
printings. It clearly struck a resonant chord among Sunnis
and Shi'a around the world.
This is not to suggest that the Islamist movement of
Sayyid Qutb is the only face of Islam in the world today; far
from it. But it has without question become an exceedingly
powerful influence across Muslim lands. While the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt did go through a very violent phase,
it is important to note that not all the followers of Qutb
accepted violent methods. The Islamist trend within Egypt
itself today seems much more non-violent than in the past,
and more peaceful than the Mubarak government cares to
acknowledge. But it was responsible for killings in the 1980s
and 1990s.
A curious side note to Qutb's execution was the arrival of
a telegram sent from Palestine to the Egyptian government
in 1966 deploring the execution of Qutb. It seems that the
telegram was sent by Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian scholar,
first trained in an agricultural school and then later in religious
studies at al-Azhar (the oldest and most famous madrasa in
the Muslim world, located in Cairo).
He became a major ideologue fox al-Qaeda when he wrote
a book in 1988, claiming that it was the individual Muslim's
th
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duty to undertake Jihad in defense of Muslim territories
in Afghanistan or wherever Muslims were threatened. He
thereby internationalized the idea of Islamic jihad. Other
fatwas that he or Ayman al-Zawahiri authored justified
martyrdom and violence against women and children. But he
was only one of several jihadis who wrote books supporting
violent jihad at that time.
25

The Iranian Revolution of 1979
The next big historical event of that era that shaped the
encounter between the Muslim world and the West was the
Iranian Revolution of 1979. It brought an extreme Islamist
regime to power in the Shi 'a world. The Shah of Iran in
the 1970s had launched a Westernizing and modernizing
program that went too far too fast, triggering a revolt of the
Shi'a Islamic scholars, the mullahs, and precipitated the
great Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979.
This relentless westernizing coupled with the regime's
brutality and corruption doomed Iran to a great step
backwards out of which it has yet to emerge. Note that the
Shah also had attempted to ban the wearing of head scarves
(chadors) in public by Iranian women, but now that is the
mandatory costume of the day. This head covering remains a
taboo subject for public discussion in Iran even today, despite
the fact that young women constantly flout the convention in
subtle ways.
The Iranian Islamist revolution gave an immense
psychological boost to the idea that the Islamic community,
both Shi 'a and Sunni, should not be dominated by Western
ideas and interests. For some Muslims, even those living
in the US, this great event showed that "Muslims can fight
back." It suggested to the Muslim community that perhaps
it was still possible for a truly Islamic modern state to
26
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exist. Naturally policy makers in Washington were greatly
fearful that the Islamic revolution would spread across the
Middle East and the broader Muslim world. Hence the US
government tacitly encouraged Saddam Hussein to militarily
oppose the Iranian regime in the 1980s.
The Wahhabis
Still another powerful Islamist current during the 20
century came from the Wahhabi influences of Saudi Arabia.
It is important to mention this influence because the Saudis'
skyrocketing oil revenues in mid-20 century enabled them
to spend vast sums of money exporting their severe Wahhabi
form of Islam around the world. Their pamphlets extolling
Wahhabi Islam appearing in Cairo fed into the Islamist trend
there also.
The Saudis established schools and universities and built
mosques that generally represented a far more conservative
and repressive Islam than was practiced elsewhere in
the Muslim world at the time. The Islamic University of
Malaysia founded in the early 1980s is such an organization,
but I have to say it looks to me entirely benign apart from
the rigid separation of the sexes and related restrictions on
intellectual freedom.
th
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The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
Finally, the last major historic event of enormous political
significance in the 20 century was the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979. This event can only be called
one of the most colossal political miscalculations in history.
Whether the US intervened covertly or not to counter the
Russians, the Afghan war of the 1980s would have turned
into a great jihadi cause, as it did. Whether or not the US,
once it had covertly joined the jihadi forces in fighting the
th
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Soviets, could have prevented Afghanistan from turning into
the Taliban haven that it did become after the Soviet defeat
and withdrawal, is a moot point.
The damage had been done and the so-called "freedom
fighters" (mujahideenj had been summoned, an Arab-Afghan
militia had been created, and the intellectual foundations for
international violent jihad had been laid by Egyptian and
other Arabs influenced by the Islamist trend flowing out of
Egypt.
27

The 20 Century Clash
If now we step back to survey the 20 century and the
Muslim world in civilizational terms (and I have omitted
the Islamist developments in Pakistan and southeast Asia),
it seems evident that major sections of the greater Muslim
world during the 20 century felt themselves under siege
politically and ideologically. Of course it is true, from a
policy point of view, and even from the point of view of
constitutionalism, that not all of the Muslim states were in
harmony. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to conclude
from the cacophonous state of Arab-Muslim relations that a
civilizational identity did not exist.
On the contrary, it is fair to say that various parts of the
Muslim world, even as scattered and unharmonious as they
were, felt themselves severely encroached upon by Western
and non-Western forces throughout the 20 century. The
overwhelming forces were cultural influences, especially
political, legal, and economic. The accommodation
and assimilation of those elements meant that Muslim
communities had to be remade according to a very different
civilizational design. It meant the remaking of Muslim
societies in ways that conform to international patterns of
law, economics and politics. Especially across the Middle
th
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East, that process of assimilation and accommodation is at
the heart of the present crisis.
Ever since the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the
1950s, the ideology of a radical separation between "East"
and "West" has dominated Islamic circles, creating a profound
bias against modern institutions, and hence the protracted
debate in Muslims countries, continuing today, about the
possibilities of imposing the Shari'a in some form. Even
surveys of university students show significant majorities
who think that imposing the Shari 'a would be a good thing
that would solve all social and economic problems.
This follows from the slogan, "Islam is the answer" that
issued from the thinking of Hassan al-Banna in the first half
of the 20 century. This debate is alive across the Muslim
world, from Morocco to Malaysia, and from Indonesia to
Turkey. Seen from this perspective, the clash of September
11 was the tragic outcome of Islamist arguments developed
in the early to mid-20 century, not the policies (however,
benighted) of recent American administrations.
Nevertheless, sober Middle Eastern politicians and
scholars have long recognized that there is no turning back of
the clock. Western and international legal conceptions such
as the territorial state, the idea of the corporate form of legal
autonomy, accompanied by a clear definition of sovereignty
and legitimate legal jurisdiction; constitutionalism, universal
human rights, and citizenship are all part of this modern
international legacy.
Part of the tragedy of the present world situation is that
these international legal forms have been only imperfectly
adopted and assimilated by Middle Eastern countries. Some
young Islamists may think that their own traditions provide
access to such ideas; more sober assessments of Islamic law,
however, suggest otherwise. 1 turn now to those issues.
28
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Can a Civilizationalist Give Policy Advice?
Can a civilizationalist offer policy advice to the higher
powers? It depends on what advice is now on offer. Here's
one example that needs rethinking because it plays into
the immense problem of establishing constitutionalism,
citizenship and just economic institutions in the Muslim
world today.
In a slender book titled, The Five Front War. The Better
Way to Fight Global Jihad, Daniel Byman of the Brookings
Institution presents a sober overview of the widespread
terrorist networks tightly or loosely affiliated with al-Qaeda.
He is aware of the benefits of democratic regimes and "good
government," yet he seems to see more risks to advocating
democratic state-building than benefits.
Wisely he notes that we need all the help that we can
get from Muslim countries and therefore we ought to build
more and better alliances. That means that diplomacy is an
important tool. But then he loses sight of the importance
of good government and democracy-building. For he says,
"money can smooth the path..." According to Byman, "As
repugnant as it might seem to American citizens, the United
States will be able to bribe local politicians to maintain the
alliances."
Apart from the obvious immorality of such "Realpolitik"
this advice reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the
political and ideological situation in the Muslim world,
especially in the Middle East and North Africa. One does
not have to read much or travel far in the Middle East to
discover that, from a Middle Easterner's point of view, all
the politicians, ministers, and judges in power in the Middle
East and North Africa are perceived as corrupt and—this is
critical—represent the modern Western way of government
and doing business. This may be shocking to us, but the fact
31
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is that the complex and overwhelming modern bureaucracies
of the region are seen as corrupted instruments borrowed
from the West that serve mainly to preserve the status quo,
especially the power of the government and its officials.
Furthermore, the modern states of the Middle East have
very efficient coercive apparatuses at their disposal. These
include the police, secret police, an army, and sometimes
multiple armies for the purpose of controlling the civilian
population and rigging elections. They have modern methods
of surveillance, use secret detention and routinely use torture
on political dissidents. This overwhelming state apparatus,
which can be found in virtually all the Arab states, especially
Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, leads
Middle Easterners to constantly refer to that apparatus as an
all-pervasive "they" who-know-all-things.
In addition, those state officials who run the countries are
often seen as tied to the machinations of Washington, paid
off by the latter, with lavish funds for military development
and the so-called war on terror. At the same time Washington
is perceived as condoning the misconduct of Middle Eastern
state officials and allowing people such as Hosni Mubarak to
remain in power in Egypt forever.
The view that modern western ways are a source of
corruption can be found in virtually any encounter with
Middle Easterners. One very pervasive aspect of the Middle
Eastern distrust of modern institutions concerns elections
and voting. A Moroccan colleague of mine (not very devout)
said to me one day in Rabat, "I would vote for the Islamists
before I would vote for them," that is, the Socialist Party or
others who have been in power. Here again the perception is
that at least the Muslims would be honest while the others
would only be interested in gaining power and enriching
themselves through corruption.
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Or ask a female reporter working in the Middle East:
who would she rather ride with—a taxi driver who is hip,
gregarious, and plays the latest pop music; or a driver who
dresses in the Muslim style (beard, Muslim cap, and worry
beads), displays Quranic verses on his dashboard, and listens
to Quranic recitations? The first driver is more likely to flirt
with the reporter, try to get her hotel address and phone
number, while the second will mind his own business and be
less likely to inflate the fare.
But it's not only government officials from the West who
engage in these practices that subvert the integrity of public
institutions in Muslim countries. Transparency International,
the global civil society organization that publishes an index
on the perception of corruption around the world, issued
its annual report in September 2007 about corruption,
low-income countries, and the judiciary. Focusing on the
corruption of high level officials, the report says, "Bribe
money often stems from multinationals based in the world's
richest countries. It can no longer be acceptable for these
companies to regard bribery in export markets as legitimate
business strategy."
I would suggest that this means that the most important
policy agenda for dealing with the Middle East and the
jihadis is a straightforward program designed to strengthen
constitutionalism, citizenship, the rule of law, and universal
human rights. At the same time efforts must be made to
establish electoral systems that guarantee, as much as
is humanly possible, the regular turnover of presidents,
ministers, and other public officials in truly free and public
elections.
The same prescription is required to improve all the
institutions of education, higher and lower. Instead of
spending $12 billion a month on a war in the Middle East,
32
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we (Americans) need a vast program to support the creation
and expansion of secular schools, the teaching of English,
and the imparting of American culture at the high school
level, if not before.
A good example of how beneficial this can be appeared
in the New York Times very recently. Young Egyptian girls
were taught English in an American-sponsored program that
saw a markedly improved attitude among the girls towards
the US, and a greater acceptance of the differences of others.

33

Far more along these lines needs to be undertaken.
Similarly, universities need to be expanded to allow students
to study subjects that they wish; libraries with adequate
books and professional staffs need to be provided, along
with a massive translation project to bring Western books
into Arabic and other Middle Eastern languages.
All such efforts need to be focused on strengthening
confidence in local institutions, legal procedures, banking
and economic systems, and educational training that is fully
commensurate with prevailing international standards. When
unemployment rates are 20 to 30% in some Middle Eastern
and North African countries, it is easy to find young men
willing to join a jihad that they see as a means of defending
what is left of a Muslim civilization that they perceive as
under attack from the West.
I do not want conclude with an excessively gloomy
picture of the Middle East; there are some very positive
things happening there that deserve our attention. But that
would require another essay.
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